



### New scenarios for resource slicing and sharing in beyond 5G networks

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#### Joint work with

#### some colleagues:

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- Ilaria Malanchini, Vinay Suryaprakash (Nokia Bell Labs)
- Mauro Passacantando (University of Pisa)
- Brunilde Sansò (Ecole Polytechnique de Montreal)

#### ... and PhD students (doing the actual work):

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- Lorela Cano
- Alessandro Lieto



European project H2020 ACT5G http://act5g.itn.liu.se



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**NOKIA** Bell Labs








# Why do we slice a wireless network?



#### **Multiple working points for 5G networks**


- For the first time 5G allows to optimize
  - not only rate performance
  - but also: energy consumption, reliability, number of users, ...
- Obviously not all at a time
- Managing multiple working points depending on applications is easier done on somehow separated network portions





#### Specialized network functions and edge computing

- The virtualization approaches of new network architecture
- Specialized service chains depending on applications
- Easy integration with edge computing modules in application domain
- Selling network and computing resources to vertical applications is easier done in separated and optimized chunks





### A sliced network is more easily shared

- Network slicing potentially allows an easier sharing of the infrastructure and its resources
- A **reshaping of mobile market** can modify the value chain that over the years has increasingly favored OTTs
- New regulatory trends (in some regions like Europe) are pushing for wholesale approaches for telco services
- Trying to allow the entrance in the market of strong players of vertical domains with local roots








## Is infrastructure and resource sharing convenient?



#### To share or not to share, this is the question

**Question**: What will be the most common industry structure for infrastructure ownership in 5G era?

Industry structure for infrastructure ownership



Source: GSMA, "The 5G Era", survey on 750 operators' CEO survey, 2017






Survey


#### State-of-the-Art

- Technical approaches
  - How to virtualize service and network portions
  - How to manage resources in shared environment
  - How to save energy
- Economic approaches
  - Strategic planning for operators
  - Asset management and market strategy
  - Economic models of sharing





## The missing link: perceived user quality and willingness to pay





- We have developed a model for mobile operators to estimate user perceived quality based on network statistical counters
- We have defined a simplified simulation model for associating quality indicators to sharing scenarios
- We have used a common model for associating quality perceived and willingness to pay





#### **Modeling convenience to share**


- Objective: provide a techno-economic framework which evaluates the viability and profitability of infrastructure sharing under different technical, economical and regulatory settings.
- Methodology: mathematical programming and game theory
- Focus: Small cells deployment






#### Scenario

- A set of MNOs with given market shares coexist in a given geographical area
- MNOs plan to upgrade their network by deploying a layer of small cell Base Stations (BS)s
- **Problem**: Will MNOs invest? If so, which coalitions will be created and how many BSs will they deploy?





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**[TWC17]** L.Cano, A.Capone, G.Carello, M.Cesana, M.Passacantando. On optimal infrastructure sharing strategies in Mobile Radio Networks. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 16(5):3003–3016, 2017.

**[JSAC16]** L.Cano, A.Capone, G.Carello, M.Cesana, M.Passacantando. Cooperative infrastructure and spectrum sharing in heterogeneous mobile networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 34(10):2617–2629, 2016.



#### Model and key findings


- MNOs are profit-maximizing entities (regulator does not intervene) modeled as a non-cooperative and as a cooperative game – w/o & w/ transferable utility
- Stable network sharing configuration: Nash Equilibria (NE) of the non-cooperative game / core of cooperative game
- Key Findings:
  - Decreasing δ makes sharing more convenient since MNOs cannot afford individual more congested networks
  - <u>Grand coalition fast becomes stable for vast majority of instances</u> (spectrum pooling gain > quality degradation due to sharing)
  - Stable cost divisions reflect the MNOs individual market and spectrum share
    e.g. an MNO with a large spectrum holding & few users can be exempted from the infrastructure cost












## How can we move from sharing to market layering?



#### **Infrastructure Provider(s) - InP**



• Assuming no-competition among infrastructure providers (InP)






#### A market? ... similarities



### Energy market

Time granularity from days to minutes



### Ads market

Time granularity from minutes to seconds





### Assumptions

- The InP behave fairly in the resource allocation phase
- Virtual Operators trade the amount of resources according to their users' needs (estimation/prediction of traffic load, type, distribution, channel qualities, etc.)
- Pricing model ensures that the InP has enough money to cover recurrent costs and expand capacity

**[Globecom18]** A. Lieto, I Malanchini, A. Capone, "Enabling Dynamic Resource Sharing for Slice Customization in 5G Networks", IEEE Globecom 2018, Abu Dhabi, UAE, 9-13 Dec. 2018


**[WiOpt17]** A. Lieto, I. Malanchini, V. Suryaprakash, A. Capone, "Making the Case for Dynamic Wireless Infrastructure Sharing: a Techno-Economic Game", WiOpt 2017 RAWNET workshop, Paris, May 15, 2017.





#### **Resource allocation problem**

- Given traffic estimation, virtual operators can set a <u>quality target</u> Q<sub>i</sub> depending on their business model
- InP resource allocation problem (RAP):
  - Assign resources to virtual operators
  - so as to maximize overall quality
  - Subject to fairness constraints






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#### **Business strategy**

• Changing the quality targets (and traffic estimations), operators can influence the resource allocation



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
#### **Costs and revenues**

To guarantee investments for capacity expansion


Revenues based on acceptance probability based on prince and quality [BLZZ03]

$$A(p,U) = 1 - e^{-Cp^{-\epsilon}U^{\mu}}$$

[BLZZ03] L. Badia, M. Lindstrom, J. Zander, and M. Zorzi, "Demand and pricing effects on the radio resource allocation of multimedia communication systems" in Globecom 2003.



#### **Market competition**








LAB


#### **Example results**



#### Work in progress:

- Modelling competition among infrastructure providers
- Fundamental to show that the approach is feasible also during transition from traditional market to the new one





## Can trading become automated?




#### How to make trading more dynamic?

- The idea is that we can automate the pricing model and combine it with real-time resource scheduling
- We add **flexibility** since scheduler is able to exploit **variations in traffic** (volume and mix)
- The business strategy remains under control of virtual operators
- Diversity in traffic mix can be accounted for (tenants of specialized slices)








**[ICC17]** O.U. Akgul, I. Malanchini, V. Suryaprakash, A. Capone, "Dynamic Resource Allocation" and Pricing for Shared Radio Access Infrastructure", IEEE ICC 2017

[Globecom17] O.U. Akgul, I. Malanchini, V. Suryaprakash, A. Capone, "Service-aware Network Slice Trading in a Shared Multi-tenant Infrastructure", IEEE Globecom 2017




### **Two Step Solution Framework: Anticipatory networking**





#### **Example results**



#### Work in progress:

- Defining an interface between automated trading and resource scheduling
- Modelling long term SLAs into trading strategies in multi-cell scenarios



#### Conclusion

- Sharing is a need for the evolution of mobile networks
- Like in different sectors, the creation of a:
  - layered market
  - with automated trading

appears a natural evolution


 Technical solutions for making resource allocation algorithms suitable for being exposed on a market like this are still to be defined



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### Thanks!





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